Cross-Framework Mapping

IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1)vsIMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2)

See exactly how IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls map to IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2). Pre-computed mappings, identified gaps, and coverage analysis.

8
Controls Mapped
3
Gaps Found
45%
Coverage

According to the TheArtOfService Compliance Knowledge Graph:

IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) maps to IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2) with 45% coverage across 5 directly mapped controls. Analysis of 11 IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls identifies 6 compliance gaps — primarily concentrated in IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement.

Source: TheArtOfService Knowledge Graph | 11 controls analysed | 723 frameworks | 332K+ cross-framework mappings

Control Mappings

Showing 8 of 8 mapped controls across 5 domains. Sign up to explore all 332K+ mappings across 723 frameworks.

IAEA NSS-17 Access Control(2 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-AccessControl-OT-IT-Authentication-AuthorizationIAEA NSS-17 - Access Control + Authentication + Authorization + IAM + Privileged Access for OT and IT2 targets
IMO-MSC-FAL-Identify-AssetInventory-ThreatsVulnerabilities-CyberRiskAssessment-RolesResponsibilitiesIMO MSC-FAL Identify Function - OT/IT Asset Inventory + Threats + Vulnerabilities + Cyber Risk Assessment + Roles and Responsibilities + Crew + CSO + DPA
IMO-MSC-FAL-Protect-AccessControl-NetworkSegmentation-MalwareDefence-Patch-Awareness-DataSecurityIMO MSC-FAL Protect Function - Access Control + Network Segmentation + Malware Defence + Patch Management + Awareness Training + Data Security + Crew BYOD + Removable Media

IAEA NSS-17 Architecture + Zones(1 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-Architecture-Zones-DefenceInDepth-SegmentationIAEA NSS-17 - Computer Security Architecture + Zone Model + Defence in Depth + Network Segmentation + Boundary
IMO-MSC-FAL-Identify-AssetInventory-ThreatsVulnerabilities-CyberRiskAssessment-RolesResponsibilitiesIMO MSC-FAL Identify Function - OT/IT Asset Inventory + Threats + Vulnerabilities + Cyber Risk Assessment + Roles and Responsibilities + Crew + CSO + DPA

IAEA NSS-17 Detect + IR + Recovery(3 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-Detect-Monitor-Logging-IR-Recovery-ExercisesIAEA NSS-17 - Detection + Monitoring + Logging + Incident Response + Recovery + Computer Security Exercises3 targets
IMO-MSC-FAL-Detect-AnomalyDetection-OT-IT-Monitoring-Reporting-BridgeAlarmsIMO MSC-FAL Detect Function - Anomaly Detection + OT and IT System Monitoring + Bridge Alarms + Log Aggregation + Incident Reporting Channels + Crew Observation
IMO-MSC-FAL-Recover-BackupRestore-ContinuityOfNavigation-LessonsLearned-DrillsIMO MSC-FAL Recover Function - Backup and Restore + Continuity of Navigation + Continuity of Cargo Operations + Continuity of Propulsion + Lessons Learned + Drills + Resilience
IMO-MSC-FAL-Respond-IncidentResponse-Communication-FlagState-PortAuthority-CIRT-USCGNVICIMO MSC-FAL Respond Function - Incident Response Plan + Containment + Communication + Flag State + Port Authority + USCG NVIC + Class Society Notification + CIRT

IAEA NSS-17 Graded Approach + Security Levels + Risk + DBT(1 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-GradedApproach-SecurityLevels-Risk-DBTIAEA NSS-17 - Graded Approach + Computer Security Levels + Risk-Informed Methodology + Threat Assessment + DBT Alignment + Consequence Analysis
IMO-MSC-FAL-Identify-AssetInventory-ThreatsVulnerabilities-CyberRiskAssessment-RolesResponsibilitiesIMO MSC-FAL Identify Function - OT/IT Asset Inventory + Threats + Vulnerabilities + Cyber Risk Assessment + Roles and Responsibilities + Crew + CSO + DPA

IAEA NSS-17 Supply Chain + Third Party(1 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-SupplyChain-ThirdParty-OEM-TrustIAEA NSS-17 - Supply Chain + Third Party + OEM + Vendor Security + Trustworthy Components
IMO-MSC-FAL-Identify-AssetInventory-ThreatsVulnerabilities-CyberRiskAssessment-RolesResponsibilitiesIMO MSC-FAL Identify Function - OT/IT Asset Inventory + Threats + Vulnerabilities + Cyber Risk Assessment + Roles and Responsibilities + Crew + CSO + DPA

Related Comparisons

Other IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) comparisons

Other IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2) comparisons

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What are the key differences between IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) and IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2)?

IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) has 11 controls across its framework, while IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2) covers 8 controls. Direct mapping analysis identifies 5 overlapping controls (45% coverage). The frameworks diverge most significantly in IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement, where 1 IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls have no direct IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2) equivalent.

How many controls map between IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) and IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2)?

Of 11 total IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls, 5 map directly to IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2) controls — representing 45% coverage. The remaining 6 controls represent compliance gaps requiring additional documentation or compensating controls to satisfy both frameworks simultaneously.

What are the compliance gaps when mapping IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) to IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2)?

6 IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls have no direct equivalent in IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2). The highest concentration of gaps is in IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement with 1 unmapped controls. These gaps represent areas where additional controls, policies, or documentation must be created to achieve compliance with both frameworks.

Which control domains have the most gaps between IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) and IMO Maritime Cybersecurity Guidelines (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2)?

The domain with the highest gap count is IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement (1 gaps). Export the full domain-by-domain gap breakdown via the Professional tier to generate a prioritised remediation roadmap.

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