TheArtOfService
Cross-Framework Mapping

IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1)vsFrench Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)

See exactly how IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls map to French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691). Pre-computed mappings, identified gaps, and coverage analysis.

6
Controls Mapped
5
Gaps Found
36%
Coverage

According to the TheArtOfService Compliance Knowledge Graph:

IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) maps to French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691) with 36% coverage across 4 directly mapped controls. Analysis of 11 IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls identifies 7 compliance gaps — primarily concentrated in IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement.

Source: TheArtOfService Knowledge Graph | 11 controls analysed | 706 frameworks | 324K+ cross-framework mappings

Control Mappings

Showing 6 of 6 mapped controls across 4 domains. Sign up to explore all 324K+ mappings across 706 frameworks.

IAEA NSS-17 Access Control(1 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-AccessControl-OT-IT-Authentication-AuthorizationIAEA NSS-17 - Access Control + Authentication + Authorization + IAM + Privileged Access for OT and IT
→Sapin2-Pillar1-Code-of-ConductPillar 1 - Anti-Corruption Code of Conduct

IAEA NSS-17 Architecture + Zones(1 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-Architecture-Zones-DefenceInDepth-SegmentationIAEA NSS-17 - Computer Security Architecture + Zone Model + Defence in Depth + Network Segmentation + Boundary
→Sapin2-Pillar1-Code-of-ConductPillar 1 - Anti-Corruption Code of Conduct

IAEA NSS-17 Graded Approach + Security Levels + Risk + DBT(2 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-GradedApproach-SecurityLevels-Risk-DBTIAEA NSS-17 - Graded Approach + Computer Security Levels + Risk-Informed Methodology + Threat Assessment + DBT Alignment + Consequence Analysis2 targets
→Sapin2-Pillar3-Risk-MappingPillar 3 - Corruption Risk Mapping (Cartographie des Risques)
→Sapin2-Pillar4-ThirdParty-DueDiligencePillar 4 - Third-Party Due Diligence (Clients, Suppliers, Intermediaries, M&A)

IAEA NSS-17 Supply Chain + Third Party(2 mappings)

IAEA-NSS17-SupplyChain-ThirdParty-OEM-TrustIAEA NSS-17 - Supply Chain + Third Party + OEM + Vendor Security + Trustworthy Components2 targets
→Sapin2-Pillar1-Code-of-ConductPillar 1 - Anti-Corruption Code of Conduct
→Sapin2-Pillar4-ThirdParty-DueDiligencePillar 4 - Third-Party Due Diligence (Clients, Suppliers, Intermediaries, M&A)

Related Comparisons

Other IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) comparisons

IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.08 mappingsIAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs ISO/IEC 27400:20227 mappingsIAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security7 mappingsIAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs NIST SP 800-171A Rev 3 - Assessing CUI Security Requirements7 mappingsIAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs OWASP Top 10:20256 mappingsIAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs OWASP DevSecOps Maturity Model (DSOMM)6 mappingsIAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs ISO 27001:20226 mappingsIAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) vs ISO/IEC 27011:20246 mappings

Other French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691) comparisons

ISO/IEC 29147:2018 vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)4 mappingsNIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0) vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)4 mappingsNIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)3 mappingsVietnam Law on Cybersecurity (No. 24/2018/QH14) vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)3 mappingsPCAOB AS 2201 - Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting (ICFR) vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)3 mappingsNIST SP 800-82 Revision 3: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)3 mappingsNIST SP 800-146 vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)3 mappingsNIST SP 800-145 vs French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)3 mappings

Stop Paying Consultants to Read Spreadsheets

AI-powered compliance intelligence across 706 frameworks — at a fraction of consulting costs.

$0/forever

Free

  • ✓ 706 framework browser
  • ✓ Cross-framework mappings (324K+)
  • ✓ 824 compliance assessments
  • ✓ 3 AI queries & searches per day
Get Started Free
Recommended
$49/month

Professional

  • ✓ Unlimited AI Compliance Advisory
  • ✓ Unlimited full-text search
  • ✓ Framework self-assessment
  • ✓ PDF, Excel & CSV exports
Start 7-Day Free Trial →

Popular framework comparisons

NIST CSF vs NIST 800-53ISO 27001 vs NIST CSFCMMC vs NIST 800-53FedRAMP vs NIST 800-53NIST CSF vs SOC 2HIPAA vs NIST 800-53ISO 27001 vs SOC 2ISO 27001 vs ISO 27701

What are the key differences between IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) and French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)?

IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) has 11 controls across its framework, while French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691) covers 14 controls. Direct mapping analysis identifies 4 overlapping controls (36% coverage). The frameworks diverge most significantly in IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement, where 1 IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls have no direct French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691) equivalent.

How many controls map between IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) and French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)?

Of 11 total IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls, 4 map directly to French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691) controls — representing 36% coverage. The remaining 7 controls represent compliance gaps requiring additional documentation or compensating controls to satisfy both frameworks simultaneously.

What are the compliance gaps when mapping IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) to French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)?

7 IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) controls have no direct equivalent in French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691). The highest concentration of gaps is in IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement with 1 unmapped controls. These gaps represent areas where additional controls, policies, or documentation must be created to achieve compliance with both frameworks.

Which control domains have the most gaps between IAEA Nuclear Security Series - Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (NSS-17-T Rev 1) and French Sapin II Law (Law No. 2016-1691)?

The domain with the highest gap count is IAEA NSS-17 Assurance + Regulator + Improvement (1 gaps). Export the full domain-by-domain gap breakdown via the Professional tier to generate a prioritised remediation roadmap.

Related Resources

How to Map Controls Across Frameworks|Multi-Framework Compliance Guide|Compliance Glossary

This platform provides educational compliance tools, not legal, regulatory, or professional compliance advice. Cross-framework mappings are AI-assisted interpretations and do not reproduce or replace official standards. Framework names and trademarks belong to their respective owners. Consult qualified professionals for your specific compliance requirements. See our Terms of Service.