The safety assessment process demonstrates that certification requirements and the company's own safety standards are met through assessments carried out and updated during development: the AFHA, PASA, SFHA, PSSA, SSA and ASA, supported by methods such as particular risk analysis, zonal safety analysis and common mode analysis, and others (fault tree, dependency diagram, Markov, model-based safety analysis, FMEA and FMES, cascading effects analysis) as needed. Independence that the safety requirements rely on is confirmed to exist, or its absence shown acceptable, using the common cause analyses, which also help generate independence requirements. The process is planned and managed to give assurance that all relevant failure conditions and all significant combinations of failures causing them have been considered, at a depth depending on the failure condition classification, integration and complexity; ARP4761A/ED-135 details the methods.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.