DO-254 / ED-80 - Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware
Section 2: System aspects of hardware design assurance – DO-254 / ED-80 - Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware

DO-254 / ED-80 - Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 2.2: 2.2 System safety assessment processes

Functional hazard assessment, preliminary system safety assessment and system safety assessment set the safety objectives for system development and show the functions meet them. The SSA turns safety objectives into safety requirements for the system and equipment that carry the basic safety objectives and attributes for functions and architecture, and with system development allocates them to hardware. Five assurance levels, A to E, correspond to the failure condition classes from catastrophic through hazardous/severe-major, major and minor to no effect (Table 2-1); the hardware level for each function comes from the FHA and the PSSA's allocation of safety requirements and failure conditions, with iterative feedback among safety, system and hardware processes so that the hardware, as designed and as built, meets its allocated safety, functional and performance requirements. For Level E no further guidance need apply.

Maintained by Gerard Blokdyk

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