A safety system may be split into elements whose systematic capabilities differ. Where a systematic fault in one SC N element causes the safety function to fail only when combined with a systematic fault in a second SC N element, the pair may be credited as SC N+1, provided sufficient independence exists between them. The combination can never exceed SC N+1, an SC N element may be used this way only once, and SC N+2 or above cannot be built by stacking SC N assemblies. Independence in the design and application of the elements must be justified by a common cause failure analysis showing that interference between elements, and between elements and the environment, is sufficiently unlikely for the SIL concerned (approaches include functional diversity, diverse technologies, no shared parts or services, no shared procedures).
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.