An element counts as proven in use only if its functionality is clearly restricted and specified and documents show that dangerous systematic faults are unlikely enough for the SIL of the functions using it, based on analysis of operating experience of a specific configuration together with suitability analysis and testing. The evidence must show the previous conditions of use match or closely resemble the intended ones and that the dangerous failure rate was not exceeded in that use; any differences are analysed and tested to show the SIL is still supported. A documented proven in use safety justification covers suitability analysis and testing, the equivalence of intended and previous operation with the impact of differences, and the statistical evidence, weighed against the element's complexity, required systematic capability and design novelty. Functions not covered by the demonstration must be shown unable to harm the functions used, and later modifications follow 7.8 and Part 3.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.