When ASIL decomposition is used, one safety requirement is replaced by redundant requirements one level further down, each placed on design elements that are adequately independent of each other (independence here is technical, not organisational), and only the permitted decomposition patterns are used. The ASIL of a safety goal is inherited by every requirement derived from it; decomposition exploits independent architectural elements to carry the requirement redundantly and possibly at a lower ASIL, and where the elements are not independent enough the redundant requirements keep the original ASIL. It can be applied to safety requirements at the functional, technical, hardware or software level, may split an intended function from its safety mechanism under the conditions of 5.4.7, and does not change the hardware metric and random failure evaluations of part 5 clauses 8 and 9. The permitted patterns (D into C(D) and A(D), B(D) and B(D), or D(D) and QM(D), and so on down) sit in 5.4, which is not held; part 11 4.7 and part 10 clause 11 illustrate the independence evidence.
The graph holds this control, the 0 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.