Foreign-made items with controlled U.S.-origin content escape the EAR only within the de minimis rules. No de minimis level applies to: certain high-performance computers with U.S. 3A001 semiconductors to Computer Tier 3 or embargoed destinations; foreign encryption technology incorporating U.S. 5E002 technology; 3B993.f.1 equipment for advanced-node IC production; 9E003 hot-section technology commingled abroad; foreign military commodities with 0A919.a.1 content to D:5; foreign items with U.S. 9x515 or 600 series .a to .x content to D:5, or .y content to E:1, E:2, Belarus, the PRC or Russia; and the SME and Footnote 5 FDP-related semiconductor equipment containing U.S. integrated circuits. Category 5 Part 2 encryption content counts only if it went through the specified ENC or public-availability routes (734.4(b)). Otherwise reexports are outside the EAR at 10 percent or less controlled U.S. content to any country and at 25 percent or less to countries outside E:1 and E:2, for commodities (including bundled AT-only or EAR99 software), software and commingled technology; U.S. software exported separately is never de minimis. Reliance on de minimis for technology requires a one-time report to BIS and a 30-day wait (Supplement No. 2). The person relying on de minimis makes and documents the calculation (fair market values, controlled content identified against the Country Chart and Part 746, not Part 744) and keeps it under Part 762; OFAC rules and the U.S.-person proliferation rules of 744.6 still apply.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.