An authorised foreign end user or consignee may transfer unclassified defense articles, including technical data, to its dual or third-country national regular employees within its own country without further DDTC approval only if it has effective procedures to prevent diversion, met either by host-nation security clearances or by screening employees for substantive contacts with 126.1 countries (regular travel, continuing contact with agents or nationals, allegiance, business ties, residence or pay from such countries), having them sign non-disclosure agreements, and keeping a technology security or clearance plan and screening records for five years, available to DDTC on request (126.18(a)-(c)). The EAR's parallel deemed-reexport exclusion requires screening for substantive contacts with Country Group D:5, an NDA, a technology security or clearance plan and records kept for the longer of five years or the employment (734.20(c)).
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.