The dependent failure analysis identifies the single causes that could lead to the failure of more than one element (common cause failures) and the failures of one element that cause the failure of another (cascading failures), assesses their risk of violating a safety requirement and defines the measures to mitigate them, giving the evidence of independence for ASIL decomposition and of freedom from interference for coexistence; part 11 4.7 restates the analysis in full for semiconductors with the dependent failure initiator list, the coupling factors, the workflow and examples. Its aims, per the SGS quotation, are to confirm that the independence or freedom from interference the design needs is actually achieved by analysing the potential causes or initiators of dependent failures, and to define measures against plausible dependent failures where needed. Requirement text not held.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.