Where no other agency's licence requirement applies, no U.S. person may without a BIS licence 'support' nuclear explosive devices outside Supplement No. 3 countries, missiles in D:4 or E:2 countries, chemical or biological weapons anywhere, whole chemical weapons precursor plants outside A:3, or military-intelligence end uses or end users in Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, the PRC, Russia, Venezuela or E:1 and E:2 countries; 'support' means shipping or transmitting items not subject to the EAR between foreign countries or transferring them in-country with knowledge of such use, facilitating that, or performing any contract, service or employment (ordering, buying, storing, using, selling, servicing, financing, transporting, forwarding, negotiating) that may assist or benefit those uses. BIS has also informed U.S. persons that a licence is needed to ship, transmit, transfer, facilitate or service items not subject to the EAR for development or production of ICs at advanced-node facilities of Macau- or D:5-headquartered entities, Category 3 B to E items for IC production at such facilities where the node is unknown, and specified semiconductor manufacturing equipment to Macau or D:5 regardless of end use, with due diligence under the KYC guidance and exclusions for clerical activities, published or fundamental research information, U.S. Government operations, back-end steps, natural U.S. persons working for U.S., A:5 or A:6-headquartered companies, and servicing outside advanced-node facilities; no licence exceptions apply.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.