SOC 2ISO 27701:2019

SOC 2 covers 53.7% of ISO 27701:2019

58 of the 108 controls in ISO 27701:2019 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for SOC 2. 50 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.

53.7%
of the target already covered
58
controls evidenced
50
genuine gaps
283
claims rejected in review

What this leaves you to do

ISO 27701:2019 has 108 controls. Holding SOC 2 already evidences 58 of them, so the work in front of you is 50 controls, not 108, which is 46% of the standard rather than all of it.

That is the whole claim. Every number in that sentence comes from the two counts above it and can be re-derived from the free tools without taking our word for any of it.

In money, using only our numbers. The full report is $299 and names 58 controls of ISO 27701:2019 you do not have to implement again, which is $5.16 per control identified. That arithmetic uses our price and our count and assumes nothing about you.

In your hours, using your assumption. We do not know what a control costs you to implement, so pick the column that looks like your organisation. These are your figures, not our claim.

If a control takes you4 hours8 hours16 hours
the 58 already evidenced are232 hours464 hours928 hours
and the 50 remaining are200 hours400 hours800 hours

Multiply by your own rate. We publish no rate because we have not measured yours, and a number built on an invented rate is the kind of claim this platform exists to argue against.

This number is directional. It says how much of ISO 27701:2019 your SOC 2 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.

390 candidate mappings were examined and 289 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.

Where the gaps are

Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.

Additional ISO/IEC 27002 guidance for PII controllers, ISO 27701:201921 of 31 evidenced, 10 to do
PIMS-specific guidance related to ISO/IEC 27002, ISO 27701:201922 of 36 evidenced, 14 to do
PIMS-specific requirements related to ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 27701:201910 of 23 evidenced, 13 to do
Additional ISO/IEC 27002 guidance for PII processors, ISO 27701:20195 of 18 evidenced, 13 to do

Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.

Claims that held

A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.

SOC2-CC1.35.3.3argued against and upheld
Organizational roles, responsibilities and authorities

Established structures, reporting lines and authorities are assigned privacy roles and responsibilities.

SOC2-CC3.25.4.1argued against and upheld
Actions to address risks and opportunities

Identifying and analysing risks to objectives is the privacy risk assessment requirement.

SOC2-CC3.15.4.2argued against and upheld
Information security objectives and planning to achieve them

Specifying objectives clearly enough to assess risk is objective setting and planning.

SOC2-CC1.45.5.2argued against and upheld
Competence

Commitment to attract, develop and retain competent individuals is the competence requirement.

SOC2-CC2.25.5.3argued against and upheld
Awareness

Internal communication of objectives and control responsibilities is the awareness requirement.

SOC2-CC3.45.6.2argued against and upheld
Information security risk assessment

Assessing changes that significantly impact internal control drives risk assessment on change.

SOC2-CC5.15.6.3argued against and upheld
Information security risk treatment

Selecting and developing control activities to mitigate risks is risk treatment.

SOC2-CC4.15.7.1argued against and upheld
Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation

Ongoing and separate evaluations are monitoring, measurement and evaluation.

Claims that did not hold

283 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.

SOC2-CC2.25.2
Context of the organization

did not survive the adversarial verification pass run by qwen3-235b-a22b-2507 via openrouter. No per-edge rationale was recorded at the time, so the process is stated rather than a reason invented.

Claimed at low confidence before it was rejected.

SOC2-CC1.15.2
Context of the organization

did not survive the adversarial verification pass run by qwen3-235b-a22b-2507 via openrouter. No per-edge rationale was recorded at the time, so the process is stated rather than a reason invented.

Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.

SOC2-CC1.25.2
Context of the organization

retired metered-API path. 56 percent of its output was refuted wherever it was re-judged, so its residue is not trusted evidence. Superseded by judgement on the Claude Max plan 2026-08-19.

Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.

SOC2-CC1.35.2
Context of the organization

Generated by the retired metered path, which was refuted at 56 percent wherever it was re-judged. Held back so an unreleased pair cannot be signed off on unreviewed mappings. Re-judge on the Max plan to revive.

Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.

SOC2-CC3.45.2.1
Understanding the organization and its context

retired metered-API path. 56 percent of its output was refuted wherever it was re-judged, so its residue is not trusted evidence. Superseded by judgement on the Claude Max plan 2026-08-19.

Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.

SOC2-CC1.35.2.1
Understanding the organization and its context

retired metered-API path. 56 percent of its output was refuted wherever it was re-judged, so its residue is not trusted evidence. Superseded by judgement on the Claude Max plan 2026-08-19.

Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.

SOC2-CC3.25.2.1
Understanding the organization and its context

Generated by the retired metered path, which was refuted at 56 percent wherever it was re-judged. Held back so an unreleased pair cannot be signed off on unreviewed mappings. Re-judge on the Max plan to revive.

Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.

SOC2-CC2.15.2.1
Understanding the organization and its context

did not survive the adversarial verification pass run by qwen3-235b-a22b-2507 via openrouter. No per-edge rationale was recorded at the time, so the process is stated rather than a reason invented.

Claimed at low confidence before it was rejected.

The full report

Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.

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