NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5C5 (Germany)

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 covers 72.7% of C5 (Germany)

88 of the 121 controls in C5 (Germany) are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5. 33 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.

72.7%
of the target already covered
88
controls evidenced
33
genuine gaps
0
claims rejected in review

What this leaves you to do

C5 (Germany) has 121 controls. Holding NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 already evidences 88 of them, so the work in front of you is 33 controls, not 121, which is 27% of the standard rather than all of it.

That is the whole claim. Every number in that sentence comes from the two counts above it and can be re-derived from the free tools without taking our word for any of it.

In money, using only our numbers. The full report is $299 and names 88 controls of C5 (Germany) you do not have to implement again, which is $3.40 per control identified. That arithmetic uses our price and our count and assumes nothing about you.

In your hours, using your assumption. We do not know what a control costs you to implement, so pick the column that looks like your organisation. These are your figures, not our claim.

If a control takes you4 hours8 hours16 hours
the 88 already evidenced are352 hours704 hours1,408 hours
and the 33 remaining are132 hours264 hours528 hours

Multiply by your own rate. We publish no rate because we have not measured yours, and a number built on an invented rate is the kind of claim this platform exists to argue against.

This number is directional. It says how much of C5 (Germany) your NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.

164 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.

Where the gaps are

Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.

C5: Cryptography and Key Management4 of 4 evidenced
C5: Security Policies and Instructions3 of 3 evidenced
C5: Identity and Access Management8 of 9 evidenced, 1 to do
C5: Organisation of Information Security6 of 7 evidenced, 1 to do
C5: Physical Security6 of 7 evidenced, 1 to do
C5: Human Resources5 of 6 evidenced, 1 to do
C5: Procurement, Development and Modification of Information Systems8 of 10 evidenced, 2 to do
C5: Security Incident Management4 of 5 evidenced, 1 to do
C5: Operations19 of 24 evidenced, 5 to do
C5: Communication Security6 of 8 evidenced, 2 to do
C5: Business Continuity Management3 of 4 evidenced, 1 to do
C5: Asset Management4 of 6 evidenced, 2 to do
C5: Control and Monitoring of Service Providers and Suppliers3 of 5 evidenced, 2 to do
C5: Product Safety and Security6 of 12 evidenced, 6 to do
C5: Compliance2 of 4 evidenced, 2 to do
C5: Portability and Interoperability1 of 3 evidenced, 2 to do
C5: Dealing with Investigation Requests from Government Agencies0 of 4 evidenced, 4 to do

Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.

Claims that held

A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.

NIST800-CM-8C5-AM-01argued against and upheld
Asset Inventory

Component inventory with required attributes and lifecycle accuracy is the same requirement.

NIST800-MP-6C5-AM-04argued against and upheld
Decommissioning of Hardware

Media sanitisation before disposal or release, by matched technique, is the decommissioning requirement.

NIST800-PS-6C5-AM-05argued against and upheld
Commitment to Permissible Use, Safe Handling and Return of Assets

Signed access agreements before access, plus reconfirmation, evidence the commitment C5 wants.

NIST800-RA-2C5-AM-06argued against and upheld
Asset Classification and Labelling

Security categorization sets protection needs across confidentiality, integrity and availability with documented rationale.

NIST800-CP-2C5-BCM-02argued against and upheld
Business impact analysis policies and instructions

Contingency plan identifies essential functions, dependencies and recovery objectives, which is the impact analysis.

NIST800-CP-2C5-BCM-03argued against and upheld
Planning business continuity

A single documented contingency plan derived from essential function analysis is exactly CP-2.

NIST800-CP-4C5-BCM-04argued against and upheld
Verification, updating and testing of the business continuity

Testing at a defined frequency, reviewing results and updating the plan matches directly.

NIST800-CA-2C5-COM-03argued against and upheld
Internal audits of the information security management system

Independent assessor, approved plan and annual assessment of control effectiveness satisfies internal ISMS audit.

Claims that did not hold

Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.

The full report

Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.

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