NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1 covers 30.2% of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management
13 of the 43 controls in APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1. 30 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
What this leaves you to do
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management has 43 controls. Holding NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1 already evidences 13 of them, so the work in front of you is 30 controls, not 43, which is 70% of the standard rather than all of it.
That is the whole claim. Every number in that sentence comes from the two counts above it and can be re-derived from the free tools without taking our word for any of it.
In money, using only our numbers. The full report is $299 and names 13 controls of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management you do not have to implement again, which is $23.00 per control identified. That arithmetic uses our price and our count and assumes nothing about you.
In your hours, using your assumption. We do not know what a control costs you to implement, so pick the column that looks like your organisation. These are your figures, not our claim.
| If a control takes you | 4 hours | 8 hours | 16 hours |
|---|---|---|---|
| the 13 already evidenced are | 52 hours | 104 hours | 208 hours |
| and the 30 remaining are | 120 hours | 240 hours | 480 hours |
Multiply by your own rate. We publish no rate because we have not measured yours, and a number built on an invented rate is the kind of claim this platform exists to argue against.
This number is directional. It says how much of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management your NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
54 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Suppliers assessed at a depth matched to what they supply
External service providers governed across their life cycle with security roles fixed
Unsupported components managed, which is where asset health quietly decays
Provider controls assessed rather than accepted, which is effectiveness testing
Organisational process carries supply chain weaknesses through to closure
Weaknesses tracked to closure with named owners and dates
Contingency plan covers loss of a critical supplier or component source
Contingency testing covers whether alternate sources can actually deliver
Claims that did not hold
Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
Buy this crosswalk