NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 covers 48.6% of NIST SP 800-172
17 of the 35 controls in NIST SP 800-172 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. 18 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
What this leaves you to do
NIST SP 800-172 has 35 controls. Holding NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 already evidences 17 of them, so the work in front of you is 18 controls, not 35, which is 51% of the standard rather than all of it.
That is the whole claim. Every number in that sentence comes from the two counts above it and can be re-derived from the free tools without taking our word for any of it.
In money, using only our numbers. The full report is $299 and names 17 controls of NIST SP 800-172 you do not have to implement again, which is $17.59 per control identified. That arithmetic uses our price and our count and assumes nothing about you.
In your hours, using your assumption. We do not know what a control costs you to implement, so pick the column that looks like your organisation. These are your figures, not our claim.
| If a control takes you | 4 hours | 8 hours | 16 hours |
|---|---|---|---|
| the 17 already evidenced are | 68 hours | 136 hours | 272 hours |
| and the 18 remaining are | 72 hours | 144 hours | 288 hours |
Multiply by your own rate. We publish no rate because we have not measured yours, and a number built on an invented rate is the kind of claim this platform exists to argue against.
This number is directional. It says how much of NIST SP 800-172 your NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
59 candidate mappings were examined and 7 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Both require authorized communication and data flows to be defined and maintained.
Both require cyber threat intelligence received from external sources.
Both feed threat information into the understanding of organizational risk.
Both require event data analysed to understand adversary activity present in systems.
Both direct the search using threat intelligence and contextual information.
Both correlate information across sources to identify risk analysts would miss.
Both require the risk carried by critical suppliers to be assessed.
Both treat supply chain risk as part of the continuing risk management cycle.
Claims that did not hold
7 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.
NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA-08 held a different requirement when this was judged: vulnerability disclosure processes, not effectiveness of risk responses. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
control identity corrected 2026-08-19: issued 3.13.1e is component diversity to limit malicious code propagation; these mappings are boundary protection and segmentation, judged against 3.1.3e's content which this control was wrongly carrying
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
control identity corrected 2026-08-19: issued 3.13.2e is introducing unpredictability into operations; these mappings are least privilege and secure engineering, a subject that appears nowhere in the issued 800-172
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
control identity corrected 2026-08-19: issued 3.14.3e is scope inclusion or segregation into purpose-specific networks; these mappings are supply chain provenance, a subject absent from the issued 800-172
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-04 held a different requirement when this was judged: establishing post-incident operational norms, not restoring critical functions to operational capability. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA-08 held a different requirement when this was judged: vulnerability disclosure processes, not effectiveness of risk responses. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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