NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0NIS2 Directive

NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 covers 50% of NIS2 Directive

14 of the 28 controls in NIS2 Directive are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. 14 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.

50%
of the target already covered
14
controls evidenced
14
genuine gaps
4
claims rejected in review

What this leaves you to do

NIS2 Directive has 28 controls. Holding NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 already evidences 14 of them, so the work in front of you is 14 controls, not 28, which is 50% of the standard rather than all of it.

That is the whole claim. Every number in that sentence comes from the two counts above it and can be re-derived from the free tools without taking our word for any of it.

In money, using only our numbers. The full report is $299 and names 14 controls of NIS2 Directive you do not have to implement again, which is $21.36 per control identified. That arithmetic uses our price and our count and assumes nothing about you.

In your hours, using your assumption. We do not know what a control costs you to implement, so pick the column that looks like your organisation. These are your figures, not our claim.

If a control takes you4 hours8 hours16 hours
the 14 already evidenced are56 hours112 hours224 hours
and the 14 remaining are56 hours112 hours224 hours

Multiply by your own rate. We publish no rate because we have not measured yours, and a number built on an invented rate is the kind of claim this platform exists to argue against.

This number is directional. It says how much of NIS2 Directive your NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.

76 candidate mappings were examined and 4 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-20, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.

Where the gaps are

Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.

NIS2 Chapter IV: Governance (Article 20)2 of 2 evidenced
NIS2 Chapter IV: Cybersecurity Risk-Management Measures (Article 21)11 of 13 evidenced, 2 to do
NIS2 Chapter IV: Incident Reporting (Article 23)1 of 6 evidenced, 5 to do
NIS2 Chapter IV: Supply Chain Assessment, Certification and Standardisation (Articles 22, 24, 25)0 of 1 evidenced, 1 to do
NIS2 Chapter V: Jurisdiction and Registration0 of 3 evidenced, 3 to do
NIS2 Chapter VI: Information Sharing0 of 1 evidenced, 1 to do
NIS2 Chapter I: General Provisions0 of 1 evidenced, 1 to do
NIS2 Chapter VII: Supervision and Enforcement0 of 1 evidenced, 1 to do

Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.

Claims that held

A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.

NIST-CSF-GV.OV-03Art.20.1argued against and upheld
Management body approves the cybersecurity risk-management measures and oversees their implementation

Risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed.

NIST-CSF-GV.RR-01Art.20.1argued against and upheld
Management body approves the cybersecurity risk-management measures and oversees their implementation

Organizational leadership is made responsible for cybersecurity risk management.

NIST-CSF-PR.AT-02Art.20.2argued against and upheld
Train the management body, and offer equivalent training to staff on a regular basis

Individuals in specialized roles are provided awareness and training.

NIST-CSF-PR.AT-01Art.20.2argued against and upheld
Train the management body, and offer equivalent training to staff on a regular basis

Personnel are provided awareness and training to perform cybersecurity duties.

NIST-CSF-GV.PO-02Art.21.2.aargued against and upheld
Policies on risk analysis and on information system security

Policy reviewed, updated, communicated and enforced.

NIST-CSF-GV.RM-06Art.21.2.aargued against and upheld
Policies on risk analysis and on information system security

A standardized method for calculating and expressing cybersecurity risk is established.

NIST-CSF-GV.PO-01Art.21.2.aargued against and upheld
Policies on risk analysis and on information system security

Cybersecurity risk management policy established based on context and strategy.

NIST-CSF-ID.IM-04Art.21.2.bargued against and upheld
Incident handling

Incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans are established and maintained.

Claims that did not hold

4 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.

NIST-CSF-RC.RP-04Art.21.2.c
Business continuity, backup management, disaster recovery and crisis management

NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-04 held a different requirement when this was judged: establishing post-incident operational norms, not restoring critical functions to operational capability. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.

Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.

NIST-CSF-ID.RA-08Art.21.2.f
Policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of the cybersecurity risk-management measures

NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA-08 held a different requirement when this was judged: vulnerability disclosure processes, not effectiveness of risk responses. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.

Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.

NIST-CSF-GV.SC-07Art.21.3
Take account of supplier-specific vulnerabilities and of Union coordinated supply chain risk assessments

NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.

Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.

NIST-CSF-RS.AN-08Art.23.4.d
Submit a final report within one month, and a progress report where the incident is still running

NIST CSF 2.0 RS.AN-08 held a different requirement when this was judged: estimating and validating an incident's magnitude, not root cause analysis. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.

Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.

The full report

Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.

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