NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0DORA

NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 covers 50% of DORA

13 of the 26 controls in DORA are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. 13 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.

50%
of the target already covered
13
controls evidenced
13
genuine gaps
0
claims rejected in review

This number is directional. It says how much of DORA your NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.

76 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-20, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.

Where the gaps are

Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.

DORA Chapter II: ICT Risk Management9 of 11 evidenced, 2 to do
DORA Chapters VI-VII: Information Sharing, Penalties and Data Protection1 of 3 evidenced, 2 to do
DORA Chapter III: ICT-Related Incident Management1 of 4 evidenced, 3 to do
DORA Chapter IV: Digital Operational Resilience Testing1 of 4 evidenced, 3 to do
DORA Chapter V: ICT Third-Party Risk Management1 of 4 evidenced, 3 to do

Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.

Claims that held

A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.

NIST-CSF-DE.AE-02DORA-Art.10argued against and upheld
Detection

Analysing potentially adverse events to understand associated activity is the detection process.

NIST-CSF-DE.CM-09DORA-Art.10argued against and upheld
Detection

Computing hardware and software monitored for adverse events adds a further detection layer.

NIST-CSF-DE.AE-08DORA-Art.10argued against and upheld
Detection

Declaring incidents when adverse events meet defined criteria is the alert threshold duty.

NIST-CSF-DE.CM-01DORA-Art.10argued against and upheld
Detection

Networks and network services monitored to find adverse events covers network performance detection.

NIST-CSF-ID.IM-04DORA-Art.11argued against and upheld
Response and recovery

Incident response and other plans established and maintained is the documented plan duty.

NIST-CSF-RS.MI-01DORA-Art.11argued against and upheld
Response and recovery

Containing incidents is the quickly contain damage duty.

NIST-CSF-RC.RP-01DORA-Art.11argued against and upheld
Response and recovery

Executing the recovery portion of the incident response plan is the recovery plan duty.

NIST-CSF-RC.RP-04DORA-Art.11argued against and upheld
Response and recovery

Restoring critical functions and services to operational capability is the continuity of critical functions duty.

Claims that did not hold

Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.

The full report

Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.

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