NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 covers 37.2% of C5 (Germany)
45 of the 121 controls in C5 (Germany) are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. 76 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
This number is directional. It says how much of C5 (Germany) your NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
134 candidate mappings were examined and 3 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Maintained inventories of managed hardware are half of the asset record the criterion requires
Maintained inventories of software, services and systems are the other half of the asset record
Hardware maintained, replaced and removed commensurate with risk, including sanitisation before disposal, is the decommissioning required
Legal, regulatory and contractual requirements understood and recorded is what this criterion requires
Evaluating and reviewing risk management performance for needed adjustments is the management assessment required
Monitoring networks and network services to find potentially adverse events is the detection of irregular traffic the criterion requires
Protecting networks and environments from unauthorised access is the zoning and restriction of network connections the criterion requires
Networks and environments protected from unauthorised access is the perimeter control this criterion requires
Claims that did not hold
1 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.
judged against C5 criterion titles before the framework carried requirement text; does not hold against the real criterion. this criterion is structural: external doors, windows, walls and locking mechanisms that resist a burglary attempt for at least ten minutes; managing, monitoring and enforcing physical access is entry control and is already mapped to C5-PS-04
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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