NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 covers 69.8% of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management
30 of the 43 controls in APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. 13 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
What this leaves you to do
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management has 43 controls. Holding NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 already evidences 30 of them, so the work in front of you is 13 controls, not 43, which is 30% of the standard rather than all of it.
That is the whole claim. Every number in that sentence comes from the two counts above it and can be re-derived from the free tools without taking our word for any of it.
In money, using only our numbers. The full report is $299 and names 30 controls of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management you do not have to implement again, which is $9.97 per control identified. That arithmetic uses our price and our count and assumes nothing about you.
In your hours, using your assumption. We do not know what a control costs you to implement, so pick the column that looks like your organisation. These are your figures, not our claim.
| If a control takes you | 4 hours | 8 hours | 16 hours |
|---|---|---|---|
| the 30 already evidenced are | 120 hours | 240 hours | 480 hours |
| and the 13 remaining are | 52 hours | 104 hours | 208 hours |
Multiply by your own rate. We publish no rate because we have not measured yours, and a number built on an invented rate is the kind of claim this platform exists to argue against.
This number is directional. It says how much of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management your NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
84 candidate mappings were examined and 4 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Both require mechanisms that keep operations running through adverse conditions.
Both require the risk carried by a critical provider assessed before reliance.
Both require due diligence before a provider is relied upon.
Both require the risk discipline embedded within the enterprise risk framework.
Both require periodic review of whether the risk approach still covers the risk.
Both require the discipline integrated into overall enterprise risk processes.
Both place ultimate oversight accountability with the board.
Both require clear roles and responsibilities set for senior management.
Claims that did not hold
4 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.
NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-04 held a different requirement when this was judged: establishing post-incident operational norms, not restoring critical functions to operational capability. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA-08 held a different requirement when this was judged: vulnerability disclosure processes, not effectiveness of risk responses. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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