NIS2 DirectiveNIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0

NIS2 Directive covers 37.7% of NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0

40 of the 106 controls in NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIS2 Directive. 66 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.

37.7%
of the target already covered
40
controls evidenced
66
genuine gaps
0
claims rejected in review

This number is directional. It says how much of NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 your NIS2 Directive evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.

104 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-20, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.

Where the gaps are

Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.

PR - Protect13 of 22 evidenced, 9 to do
ID - Identify9 of 21 evidenced, 12 to do
RS - Respond5 of 13 evidenced, 8 to do
Govern1 of 3 evidenced, 2 to do
GV - Govern9 of 28 evidenced, 19 to do
RC - Recover2 of 8 evidenced, 6 to do
DE - Detect1 of 11 evidenced, 10 to do

Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.

Claims that held

A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.

Art.23.4.bNIST-CSF-DE.AE-04argued against and upheld
Estimated impact and scope of adverse events are understood

Requires an initial assessment of severity and impact within 72 hours of awareness.

Art.20.1NIST-CSF-GV.OV-03argued against and upheld
Risk management performance is evaluated

Body must receive reporting good enough to judge whether implementation is real.

Art.21.2.aNIST-CSF-GV.PO-01argued against and upheld
Cybersecurity risk management policy is established based on context and strategy

Requires the information system security policy set codifying protection decisions.

Art.21.2.aNIST-CSF-GV.PO-02argued against and upheld
Policy is reviewed, updated, communicated, and enforced

Policies must be revisited, and must state what happens when they cannot be met.

Art.21.2.aNIST-CSF-GV.RM-06argued against and upheld
A standardized method for calculating and expressing cybersecurity risk is established

Risk analysis limb requires a repeatable method with criteria for assessing and accepting risk.

Art.20.1NIST-CSF-GV.RR-01argued against and upheld
Organizational leadership is responsible for cybersecurity risk management

Approval of the measures sits with the management body and cannot be delegated away.

Art.21.2.iNIST-CSF-GV.RR-04argued against and upheld
Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices

Human resources limb requires screening, security terms in employment and leaver handling.

Art.21.2.dNIST-CSF-GV.SC-01argued against and upheld
Cybersecurity supply chain risk management program is established

Requires managing the security aspects of every direct supplier and service provider.

Claims that did not hold

Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.

The full report

Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.

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