CMMC 2.0 covers 31.7% of AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar
20 of the 63 controls in AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar are already satisfied by evidence you collected for CMMC 2.0. 43 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
This number is directional. It says how much of AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar your CMMC 2.0 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
80 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
An incident handling capability spanning preparation to recovery is the same plan
Testing the incident response capability is how playbooks are exercised
Periodic testing of the response capability is the same simulation requirement
MFA for privileged accounts is the root user protection this control requires
Monitoring security alerts and advisories and acting on them is the identical requirement
Enforcing minimum password complexity is the password policy element
MFA for privileged and non-privileged accounts is the strong sign-in requirement
Limiting access to authorized users, processes and devices is the access requirement definition
Claims that did not hold
Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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