Invalid authentication attempts must be limited by: locking the user ID after at most 10 attempts; and keeping the account locked for at least 30 minutes, or until the user has been positively identified. The guidance advises confirming identity before a locked account is reactivated, for example by an administrator, the help desk or a self-service reset mechanism. Applicability: not intended for point-of-sale terminal user accounts that are limited to a single card number per transaction. Objective under the customized approach: an authentication factor cannot be guessed through an online brute force attack.
This control maps to 19 controls across 17 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
PCI DSS 4.0 8.3.4 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of PCI DSS 4.0 your existing evidence covers. Hold ISO 27001:2022 and 139 of 280 PCI DSS 4.0 controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 415 were rejected on the ISO 27001:2022 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 19 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.