A user's identity must be verified before any authentication factor is modified. The guidance lists modifications this includes (password resets, issuing new hardware or software tokens, generating new keys), explains the social engineering risk of a caller posing as a user to the help desk, and gives example verification methods such as secret questions, knowledge-based information or calling back a known, previously recorded phone number. Objective under the customized approach: nobody can get into a system by posing as an authorized user.
This control maps to 22 controls across 12 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
PCI DSS 4.0 8.3.3 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of PCI DSS 4.0 your existing evidence covers. Hold ISO 27001:2022 and 139 of 280 PCI DSS 4.0 controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 415 were rejected on the ISO 27001:2022 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 22 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.