A networked device can be recognised from its parts and accessories (maker logos, serial numbers, docking cradles, chargers), helped by: its observable design; its interface (power connectors are often maker-specific); its label (inside a powered-off mobile's battery bay, identifiers such as the 15-digit IMEI which on GSM handsets encodes the maker, the model and where it was type-approved, or the 32-bit ESN whose leading bits identify the maker, especially useful with a lookup database); and, for phones with a known number, a reverse lookup to find the network operator. Because mobile devices are small, the DEFR takes extra care to find all relevant ones, secures the scene so nobody removes devices, and protects devices that may hold evidence from unauthorised access. Where communication must not be interrupted, authorised people are told of the possible problems (for example not alerting unknown parties by shutting a device down).
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.