Taking the technical safety concept and the architecture of the system as the starting point, hardware safety requirements are set, the HSI started in part 4 6.4.7 is refined, and both are checked for consistency with the concept and the architecture. Requirements that land on both hardware and software are split until hardware-only requirements remain, then detailed against the design constraints; the inputs are part 4's technical safety concept, system architecture and HSI. 6.4.1 calls for a specification of hardware safety requirements for the item's hardware elements, drawn from the technical safety requirements assigned to hardware; 6.4.2 says it must hold every safety-relevant hardware requirement, including those, with the safety mechanisms' relevant properties, for mastering failures inside the element (transient faults too where the technology warrants), for mastering or tolerating failures from outside it, for satisfying other elements' safety requirements, and for detecting and reporting internal and external failures. The rest of 6.4 (further contents, attributes and verification) is not held.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.