Financial entities other than microenterprises set up, keep and periodically review a robust, comprehensive programme of digital operational resilience testing within the ICT risk management framework, applied proportionately under Article 4(2), to assess incident preparedness, find weaknesses and fix them promptly. For those entities the programme follows a risk-based approach reflecting the evolving ICT risk landscape, specific risks and the criticality of assets and services; tests are run by independent internal or external parties (internal testers need sufficient resources and no conflicts of interest); issues found are prioritised, classified and remedied with internal validation that they are closed; and appropriate tests are run at least yearly on every ICT system and application that supports a critical or important function (Art. 24(3) to (6)). Microenterprises are outside these paragraphs and test under Article 25(3), balancing testing resources and time against urgency, risk type and criticality. Entities identified by their competent authority must add TLPT under Article 26.
This control maps to 39 controls across 17 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
DORA DORA-Art.24 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of DORA your existing evidence covers. Hold NIS2 Directive and 17 of 26 DORA controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 0 were rejected on the NIS2 Directive pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 39 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.