Lighting should not be relied on only for psychological deterrence but used with barrier systems protecting assets. Because it is cheap to maintain, a clear maintenance programme should exist, coordinated with technical surveillance so areas needing observation are well lit. It is advisable for all sensitive areas the risk analysis flags as needing observation. A secure auxiliary power source should give resilience and redundancy. Lighting lets security staff see activity around and inside protected areas and better assess and intervene in attempted unauthorised access. It should be integrated with barriers, entry and access control and surveillance rather than run on its own, and its side effects on neighbouring property and zoning rules should be considered.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.