SOC 2 covers 29.8% of C5 (Germany)
36 of the 121 controls in C5 (Germany) are already satisfied by evidence you collected for SOC 2. 85 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
This number is directional. It says how much of C5 (Germany) your SOC 2 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
124 candidate mappings were examined and 9 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Protections are removed only once the ability to read or recover the data has been diminished, which is the erasure limb of decommissioning
Ongoing and separate evaluations of whether controls are present and functioning are the internal audits this criterion requires
Evaluating deficiencies and communicating them to senior management and the board is the security performance reporting required
Monitoring system components for anomalies indicative of malicious acts, with those anomalies analysed, is the detection of irregular traffic the criterion requires
Logical access measures against threats outside the system boundary are the perimeter control this criterion requires
Protecting information during transmission between authorised parties is the transport encryption required
Authorising, documenting, testing, approving and implementing changes is the documented change management this criterion requires
Changes are tested and approved before implementation, which is the change testing required
Claims that did not hold
2 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.
judged against C5 criterion titles before the framework carried requirement text; does not hold against the real criterion. this criterion is about which security obligations continue to bind a person after their engagement ends and for how long; removing access when it is no longer required is access withdrawal and belongs to C5-IDM-04
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
judged against C5 criterion titles before the framework carried requirement text; does not hold against the real criterion. this criterion is structural: external doors, windows, walls and locking mechanisms that resist a burglary attempt for at least ten minutes; restricting physical access to authorised personnel is entry control and is already mapped to C5-PS-04
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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