NIST SP 800-218ISO 27002:2022

NIST SP 800-218 covers 8.6% of ISO 27002:2022

8 of the 93 controls in ISO 27002:2022 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST SP 800-218. 85 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.

8.6%
of the target already covered
8
controls evidenced
85
genuine gaps
0
claims rejected in review

This number is directional. It says how much of ISO 27002:2022 your NIST SP 800-218 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.

51 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.

Where the gaps are

Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.

Technological controls7 of 34 evidenced, 27 to do
Organizational controls1 of 37 evidenced, 36 to do
People controls0 of 8 evidenced, 8 to do
Physical controls0 of 14 evidenced, 14 to do

Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.

Claims that held

A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.

SP800-218-PW.4.45.21argued against and upheld
Managing information security in the ICT supply chain

Verifying third party and open source components against security requirements is ICT supply chain assurance.

SP800-218-PW.4.15.21argued against and upheld
Managing information security in the ICT supply chain

Tracking component origin and verifying provenance manages risk along the software supply chain.

SP800-218-PS.3.25.21argued against and upheld
Managing information security in the ICT supply chain

A machine readable bill of materials gives the supply chain visibility this control depends on.

SP800-218-PS.2.15.21argued against and upheld
Managing information security in the ICT supply chain

Signed releases and published hashes let downstream consumers verify supply chain integrity.

SP800-218-PO.4.18.25argued against and upheld
Secure development life cycle

Defined release criteria are the lifecycle gate an assessor looks for under secure development rules.

SP800-218-PO.3.28.25argued against and upheld
Secure development life cycle

Toolchain configured to enforce the secure development policy evidences the rules being applied, not just written.

SP800-218-PO.2.18.25argued against and upheld
Secure development life cycle

Assigned secure development roles and responsibilities are part of the lifecycle rules this control requires.

SP800-218-PO.1.18.25argued against and upheld
Secure development life cycle

Documented security requirements for development are the core rules a secure development lifecycle must establish.

Claims that did not hold

Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.

The full report

Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.

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