NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1 covers 35.8% of NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
38 of the 106 controls in NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1. 68 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
What this leaves you to do
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 has 106 controls. Holding NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1 already evidences 38 of them, so the work in front of you is 68 controls, not 106, which is 64% of the standard rather than all of it.
That is the whole claim. We do not know your hourly rate, how long a control takes you, or how many people you have, so there is no figure here in dollars or weeks. Every number in that sentence comes from the two counts above it and can be re-derived from the free tools without taking our word for any of it.
This number is directional. It says how much of NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 your NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
165 candidate mappings were examined and 7 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Advisories about acquired components provide the contextual information.
Threat hunting integrates intelligence into active analysis rather than waiting.
Threat awareness of actors targeting the supply chain feeds analysis.
Monitors for behaviour indicating compromise arriving through delivered components.
Continuously monitors supplier and provider risk rather than at fixed points.
Cross organizational audit logging so activity spanning the boundary can be reconstructed.
Reviews supply chain activity in logs for misuse of supplier access.
Verifies software and firmware integrity before and after installation.
Claims that did not hold
7 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21. A judgement made against different text is void whatever its outcome.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21. A judgement made against different text is void whatever its outcome.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21. A judgement made against different text is void whatever its outcome.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07 held a different requirement when this was judged: understanding, recording, prioritising and monitoring supplier risk, not verifying supply chain risk management. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21. A judgement made against different text is void whatever its outcome.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA-08 held a different requirement when this was judged: vulnerability disclosure processes, not effectiveness of risk responses. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21. A judgement made against different text is void whatever its outcome.
Claimed at medium confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-04 held a different requirement when this was judged: establishing post-incident operational norms, not restoring critical functions to operational capability. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21. A judgement made against different text is void whatever its outcome.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-04 held a different requirement when this was judged: establishing post-incident operational norms, not restoring critical functions to operational capability. Corrected against the issued core 2026-08-21. A judgement made against different text is void whatever its outcome.
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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