DORASOC 2

DORA covers 37.7% of SOC 2

23 of the 61 controls in SOC 2 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for DORA. 38 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.

37.7%
of the target already covered
23
controls evidenced
38
genuine gaps
0
claims rejected in review

This number is directional. It says how much of SOC 2 your DORA evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.

43 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-20, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.

Where the gaps are

Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.

A - Availability3 of 3 evidenced
CC - Common Criteria (Security)19 of 33 evidenced, 14 to do
C - Confidentiality1 of 2 evidenced, 1 to do
P - Privacy0 of 18 evidenced, 18 to do
PI - Processing Integrity0 of 5 evidenced, 5 to do

Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.

Claims that held

A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.

DORA-Art.7SOC2-A1.1argued against and upheld
Maintains capacity to meet availability commitments

Systems must carry sufficient capacity for additional processing needs under stressed conditions.

DORA-Art.12SOC2-A1.2argued against and upheld
Environmental protections, data backups, and recovery infrastructure support availability

Documented backup policies, segregated backup systems and restoration procedures are required.

DORA-Art.11SOC2-A1.3argued against and upheld
Recovery plan procedures support system recovery from failures

Response and recovery plans are subject to regular testing.

DORA-Art.8SOC2-C1.1argued against and upheld
Confidential information is identified and protected during receipt, processing, storage

Information assets must be identified, classified and documented across the entity.

DORA-Art.5SOC2-CC1.2argued against and upheld
COSO principle 2: Board exercises oversight responsibility

The management body must oversee the ICT risk framework and bear ultimate responsibility for it.

DORA-Art.5SOC2-CC1.3argued against and upheld
COSO principle 3: Management establishes structures, reporting lines, and authorities

Roles, responsibilities and authorities for all ICT-related functions must be established.

DORA-Art.5SOC2-CC1.5argued against and upheld
COSO principle 5: Holds individuals accountable for internal control responsibilities

Assigned ICT responsibilities sit under the management body's ultimate accountability.

DORA-Art.14SOC2-CC2.2argued against and upheld
COSO principle 14: Internally communicates information including objectives and responsibilities

Communication policies must be designated for internal staff alongside crisis communication plans.

Claims that did not hold

Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.

The full report

Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.

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