Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) v4.0.1 covers 65.7% of NIST SP 800-172
23 of the 35 controls in NIST SP 800-172 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) v4.0.1. 12 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
This number is directional. It says how much of NIST SP 800-172 your Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) v4.0.1 evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
62 candidate mappings were examined and 2 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Splitting duties so no one identity both performs and approves a sensitive action is dual authorization.
Authenticating connections by equipment identity restricts access to organisation issued resources.
Segmentation and segregation with monitored boundaries controls flows between domains.
Reviewing audit logs for activity outside expected patterns and acting on it is threat hunting.
Independent assessment against recognised standards repeated annually is this assessment.
Annual internal testing of whether controls are working meets the effectiveness requirement.
Periodic security assessments across every supply chain organisation is the monitoring limb.
Reassessing supply chain risk on a recurring cycle rather than at onboarding is this requirement.
Claims that did not hold
2 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.
control identity corrected 2026-08-19: issued 3.13.1e is component diversity to limit malicious code propagation; these mappings are boundary protection and segmentation, judged against 3.1.3e's content which this control was wrongly carrying
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
control identity corrected 2026-08-19: issued 3.13.2e is introducing unpredictability into operations; these mappings are least privilege and secure engineering, a subject that appears nowhere in the issued 800-172
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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