C5 (Germany) covers 49.2% of AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar
31 of the 63 controls in AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar are already satisfied by evidence you collected for C5 (Germany). 32 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
This number is directional. It says how much of AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar your C5 (Germany) evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
97 candidate mappings were examined and 2 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
C5's incident policy defines classification, prioritisation and escalation rules, a standing response team and timely customer notification.
C5 measures and monitors incident type and volume and uses the analysis to decide where further protection is needed.
C5 runs a recurring audience-specific training programme on secure software development, delivery and the tools involved.
C5 tests each change to a depth matching its risk rating and rates and remediates defects against defined severity criteria.
C5 commissions penetration tests at least annually under a documented methodology across risk-identified components.
C5 requires authorised personnel or approval components to release each change into production against defined criteria.
C5 places deployment tooling under enforced authorisation and logs every production change traceably.
C5 strictly separates customer data held on shared virtual and physical resources under a documented risk derived approach.
Claims that did not hold
2 proposed mappings for this pair were rejected. They are kept in the graph rather than deleted, so what was thrown out is as inspectable as what survived. A crosswalk that never rejects anything is not being judged.
judged against C5 criterion titles before the framework carried requirement text; does not hold against the real criterion; C5-OPS-13 requires automated analysis and correlation of log data; configuring and enabling service and application logging is OPS-10
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
judged against C5 criterion titles before the framework carried requirement text; does not hold against the real criterion; C5-IDM-07 requires the customer be notified of provider access to unencrypted data; it enforces no access control over data
Claimed at high confidence before it was rejected.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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