AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar covers 14% of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
42 of the 300 controls in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 are already satisfied by evidence you collected for AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar. 258 are genuine gaps. Every claim below was judged against both control sets and then argued against; the ones that did not survive are published further down with the reason each failed.
This number is directional. It says how much of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 your AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar evidence satisfies. The reverse pair is a different number, often very different, because a security standard has enormous depth for access control and almost none for lawful basis or data subject rights.
161 candidate mappings were examined and 0 were removed. Signed off 2026-08-19, review level machine verified. Mappings were judged by Claude Code rather than read line by line by a practitioner. Every claim shows its reasoning so you can check it. Ask and a practitioner will review this pair. This pair was signed off, then RETRACTED by its own builder on discovering that half of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 carried label-only descriptions, and restored 2026-08-19 after that framework was rebuilt from the OSCAL catalogue. The mappings are unchanged and were never re-judged, because the judgement was sound; only the target text was thin.
Where the gaps are
Coverage is never evenly spread. A source standard usually satisfies one part of a target almost completely and barely touches another, and which part is which is the thing worth knowing before you plan the work.
Theme level, not control level, deliberately. The per-control list of what is evidenced and what is a gap is the report itself, so publishing it here would be publishing the thing being sold.
Claims that held
A sample. Each one names the control whose evidence does the work, the control it satisfies, and why.
Joiner mover leaver automation evidences account creation, modification and removal tied to authorised triggers.
Credential reports and stale user removal evidence periodic account review and disabling of inactive accounts.
Central IdP federation governs the account lifecycle, provisioning and deprovisioning an assessor samples.
Organisation scoped sharing conditions evidence that sharing partners match documented access restrictions.
Public access detection with validation against documented intent is the review this control requires.
Layered IAM, resource, KMS and endpoint policies demonstrate enforcement of approved authorisations on data.
Service control policies enforce non-negotiable authorisation boundaries that cannot be overridden locally.
IAM policies granting only required actions, resources and conditions are the enforcement artefact assessors test.
Claims that did not hold
Nothing proposed for this pair was rejected in review. That is unusual and worth knowing rather than hiding: it means the candidate set was small and every candidate held.
The full report
Everything above is a sample. The report is every evidenced control and every gap, with the reasoning and the source document behind each one, in a form you can hand to an assessor. $299, emailed immediately.
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