A dominant service provider (40 percent or more of gross revenues in a market, or designated by the Regulator) must not abuse its position, including by failing to supply essential facilities to a competitor within a reasonable time and on reasonable conditions or discriminating in interconnection or other services without objective justification; tying unwanted services; offering better terms unjustified by cost if the competitor takes unwanted services; pre-emptively securing scarce facilities or rights of way; pricing competitive services below long-run average incremental cost or another cost standard the Regulator sets; cross-subsidising competitive services to lessen competition without approval; failing its Part 7 interconnection obligations; margin squeezes, inducing suppliers not to sell to a competitor, designing networks to prevent interoperability, withholding needed technical or facility information, or using competitors' interconnection information to compete, where these impede entry or expansion; and any other conduct the Regulator determines materially restricts or distorts competition (26-27). Remedies include cease-and-change orders, a surcharge of up to 100,000 tala payable to the Treasury Fund, required meetings, a published acknowledgement and apology, and periodic reports, and licence revocation for non-payment (30).
The graph holds this control, the 0 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.