Users must not be able to turn off or change anti-malware mechanisms, except where this is specifically documented and authorised by management case by case, for a limited period. Where disabling is needed (for example for maintenance or troubleshooting) the reason should be understood and approved, the change carried out by authorised personnel, and alerting and follow-up should exist when administrators disable protection on their own devices. Applicability: temporary disabling is permitted only for a legitimate technical need with case-by-case management authorisation, and must be formally approved; extra safeguards may be needed while protection is off, such as disconnecting the system from the Internet and running a full scan once protection is restored. Customized approach objective: unauthorised personnel cannot modify anti-malware mechanisms.
This control maps to 27 controls across 17 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
PCI DSS 4.0 5.3.5 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of PCI DSS 4.0 your existing evidence covers. Hold ISO 27001:2022 and 139 of 280 PCI DSS 4.0 controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 415 were rejected on the ISO 27001:2022 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 27 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.