Key-management policies and procedures must be in place that stop cryptographic keys from being substituted without authorization. Guidance explains that an attacker who swaps in a key they know can decrypt everything encrypted with it, so encryption solutions should refuse any key that comes from an unexpected process or an unauthorized source, and individuals holding key components or shares should not also be able to reach enough other components to reach the threshold for deriving the key. Objective under the customized approach: unauthorized personnel cannot substitute cryptographic keys.
This control maps to 19 controls across 11 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
PCI DSS 4.0 3.7.7 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of PCI DSS 4.0 your existing evidence covers. Hold ISO 27001:2022 and 139 of 280 PCI DSS 4.0 controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 415 were rejected on the ISO 27001:2022 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 19 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.