Key-management policies and procedures must be in place for retiring, replacing or destroying keys that protect stored account data where necessary, when: (1) the key's defined cryptoperiod has ended; (2) the key's integrity is weakened, including when someone aware of a cleartext key component departs the organisation or moves out of the role that gave them that knowledge; (3) the key is believed or confirmed to be compromised. Keys that have been retired or replaced must not be used for encryption. Applicability: retired or replaced keys that must be kept are to be archived securely (for example wrapped with a key-encryption key). Guidance says archived keys should serve for decryption or verification alone, and a compromised key should be dealt with through the Requirement 12.10.1 incident response plan. Objective under the customized approach: keys are taken out of active use once their integrity is believed or confirmed to be weakened.
This control maps to 20 controls across 13 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
PCI DSS 4.0 3.7.5 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of PCI DSS 4.0 your existing evidence covers. Hold ISO 27001:2022 and 139 of 280 PCI DSS 4.0 controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 415 were rejected on the ISO 27001:2022 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 20 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.