When whole-disk or partition encryption, rather than database file, column or field encryption, makes PAN unreadable, it must be managed so that: (1) logical access is managed apart from, and independently of, the operating system's own access control and authentication mechanisms; (2) decryption keys are not linked to user accounts; and (3) any authentication factor (password, passphrase or cryptographic key) that gives access to unencrypted data is stored securely. Applicability: such encryption must still comply with the remaining encryption and key-management rules of the standard. Guidance notes that many such tools decrypt transparently after a start-up password, which offers no defence against someone who already holds a valid account. Objective under the customized approach: disk encryption is set up so that decryption needs its own authentication and logical access controls.
This control maps to 25 controls across 14 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
PCI DSS 4.0 3.5.1.3 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of PCI DSS 4.0 your existing evidence covers. Hold ISO 27001:2022 and 139 of 280 PCI DSS 4.0 controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 415 were rejected on the ISO 27001:2022 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 25 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.