GOV authorises: consignments to the IAEA and Euratom for safeguards use (excluding Very Sensitive List items, EI encryption items, and Sensitive List or 600 series items outside A:5); items for personal use of U.S. Government personnel; exports by or consigned to U.S. Government agencies for official use (including contractor support personnel inside government facilities, not private security contractors); exports for or on behalf of U.S. agencies under a contract, for cooperative programmes with written agency authorisation, for temporary support of foreign assistance programmes (four years), for ACSAs, Government Furnished Equipment (with a property statement on shipping documents), DoD or DOE directives, FMS deliveries, technology under a government contract (not 600 series development or production technology) and microelectronics under contract, with EEI naming GOV and authorisation needed before any resale or disposal; official use by cooperating governments (A:1, Singapore, Taiwan) and NATO, excluding Very Sensitive List, EI, NP, certain regional stability items, cybersecurity items and, outside A:5, Sensitive List and 600 series items; OPCW inspections (with confidentiality of business information); and short-notice 9A004 items for ISS supply launches from France, Japan, Kazakhstan or Russia, with six-month retention limits and records of the notification, export and launch dates.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.