Aircraft and system integration and verification confirm that all aircraft systems work correctly alone and together as installed, usually progressing from item-by-item integration to full system integration, at intra-system, inter-system and aircraft level as needed, often in laboratory or simulation environments. Besides verifying intended functions, a strategy or method is developed to look for unintended behaviors, stating the levels and types of testing (scenario-based, targeted, opportunistic testing by suitably experienced people), with particular attention to design features that mitigate unsafe conditions such as monitors, fault isolation and partitioning. Example test considerations include failed-state testing or simulation that challenges protective features (outside the envelope where needed), pilot inputs over wide ranges and rates, out-of-range or invalid signals, normal and abnormal power-up, power transients and failures, failure conditions including sequential failures, abnormal external signals, data bus disturbances and monitor nuisance-trip susceptibility. Deficiencies are fed back to the relevant development or integral activity and the process iterated; the output is an integrated and verified system with data showing it meets all requirements, and a summary of verification results including the investigation for unintended behaviors.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.