Where a service provider relies on segmentation to separate the CDE from other networks, it must run penetration tests on those segmentation controls: twice a year at a minimum, plus whenever segmentation controls or methods change; covering every segmentation control or method in use; in line with the penetration testing methodology the entity has defined; confirming the controls or methods are operational and effective and keep every out-of-scope system separated from the CDE; confirming the effectiveness of any isolation separating systems of different security levels (Requirement 2.2.3 refers); carried out by a tester who is qualified, whether an internal resource or an external third party; and with organizational independence of the tester (a QSA or ASV is not required). Applicability: applies only when the assessed entity is a service provider. Objective under the customized approach: where segmentation is used, technical testing, including after any changes, confirms it keeps working to wall off out-of-scope systems from the CDE.
This control maps to 23 controls across 9 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
PCI DSS 4.0 11.4.6 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of PCI DSS 4.0 your existing evidence covers. Hold ISO 27001:2022 and 139 of 280 PCI DSS 4.0 controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 415 were rejected on the ISO 27001:2022 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 23 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.