New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM)
Chapter 2: Information Security Services within Government – New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM)

New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM) 2.4.13.C.06: 2.4.13.C.06 Factors for prioritising cryptographic transition

When ranking systems that are vulnerable to future cryptographically relevant computers, agencies should weigh these factors: (1) whether the system is a high value asset under agency requirements; (2) whether it protects sensitive information, for example root keys, signing keys, key stores, passwords, personal information and classified information; (3) whether other systems, inside or outside the agency, rely on the cryptographic protections of the vulnerable system; and (4) how long the data has to stay protected.

Maintained by Gerard BlokdykVerified against the published standard Control text last updated

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  • ISM-2073 Post-quantum cryptography transition plan

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Other controls in Chapter 2: Information Security Services within Government – New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM)

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