The handbook's tables set the choices. Key exchange or encapsulation: ML-KEM recommended, deployed together with ECDH; FrodoKEM and Classic McEliece acceptable as more conservative but not yet standardised, at level 5 or 3 parameters; ECDH and RSA deprecated except as the classical half of a hybrid. Stateless signatures: ML-DSA recommended with ECDSA or EdDSA alongside, SLH-DSA recommended and acceptable without a classical partner and even at level 1; FN-DSA listed only as acceptable, its standard not yet final and its floating-point arithmetic hard to protect against side channels. Stateful hash-based signatures (XMSS, LMS, HSS) only where the signing state can be managed reliably, following NIST guidance. Parameters: ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 (level 5) preferred, ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 acceptable. Symmetric: AES-256 recommended with AES-128 acceptable, SHA-2 and SHA-3 families, AES-GCM, AES-OCB or ChaCha20-Poly1305 for authenticated encryption and CMAC-AES, HMAC-SHA-2 or KMAC for message authentication; MD5, SHA-1, (T)DES, IDEA, Blowfish, RC4 and CBC-MAC deprecated. The tables are not exhaustive (password hashing needs special functions such as Argon2).
This control maps to 7 controls across 3 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 7 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.