Every communication, remote access included, is routed through one or more approved application-level firewalls, including connections to and from the operator's non-system hosts: the firewall sits at the boundary of two dissimilar security domains; no device in the host's broadcast domain can establish an alternate path bypassing it; redundant paths also pass through an application-level firewall; only firewall applications reside on it; only a limited number of accounts exist on it; it rejects all connections except those specifically approved and all connections from destinations that cannot reside on the originating network, such as RFC 1918 addresses arriving on the public interface; and it permits remote access only over current encrypted protocols.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.