Any radio equipment that can communicate over the internet, directly or through intermediate equipment, must be designed so that it neither damages a network or its operation nor abuses network resources so that service degrades unacceptably. Recital 9 gives the threat picture the requirement answers: equipment conscripted to flood a network, break the connection between two devices, lock a person or system out of a service, or corrupt information. In practice the manufacturer must show that the product resists being turned into an attack platform (secure defaults, authenticated management, resilience to malformed traffic, controlled outbound behaviour, patchable software) and that its own traffic patterns cannot swamp the networks it joins. This is the broadest of the three activated requirements: it has no further condition beyond internet connectivity, and it continues to apply even to equipment that is released from (e) and (f) under Article 2(2).
The graph holds this control, the 0 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.