Before it enters into, or materially modifies, a material arrangement the entity must (a) carry out suitable due diligence, including a suitable selection process and a check of whether the provider can keep delivering the service over time; and (b) evaluate the financial and non-financial risks of relying on the provider, including risks from geographic location or from concentration in the provider or in parties the provider relies on. This due diligence still applies where para 57 or 58 exempts an arrangement from paras 53 and 54, limb (d) of para 55 and limbs (a) and (c) of para 59.
This control maps to 2 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management 52 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management your existing evidence covers. Hold NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 and 30 of 87 APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 4 were rejected on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 2 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.