The entity must (a) define and identify its critical operations and keep a register of them; (b) take reasonable steps to cut both the likelihood and the impact of disruption to them; (c) keep a credible BCP showing how it will hold critical operations within tolerance through disruptions, with DR planning covering critical information assets (separate crisis management and DR plans can sit within the BCP set); (d) invoke the BCP when a disruption calls for it; and (e) restore normal operations promptly when the disruption ends. Para 34 describes a critical operation as a process run by the entity or its service provider whose disruption beyond tolerance would materially harm policyholders, depositors, beneficiaries or other customers, or the entity's role in the financial system.
This control maps to 2 controls across 2 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management 33 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management your existing evidence covers. Hold NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 and 30 of 87 APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 4 were rejected on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 2 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.