Within the risk management framework that CPS 220 or SPS 220 already requires, the entity must build and keep up: (a) governance for overseeing operational risk; (b) a view of the operational risk profile, with a stated appetite backed by indicators, limits and tolerances; (c) internal controls that are effective both in design and in operation; (d) operational risk monitoring, analysis and reporting plus escalation routes for incidents and events; (e) one or more BCPs describing how it will detect, handle and respond to a disruption while staying within tolerance, tested regularly against severe yet plausible scenarios; and (f) processes for managing service provider arrangements.
This control maps to 2 controls across 2 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management 15 is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management your existing evidence covers. Hold NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 and 30 of 87 APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 4 were rejected on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 2 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.