US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
The joint US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (December 2023): the eleven guidelines and the economic and evidence-based tests by which the two agencies judge whether a merger may substantially lessen competition, with what merging parties should be ready to show at each step, from the HHI presumption to market definition and rebuttal evidence.
US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) is a compliance framework from United States with 15 domains and 61 controls. The largest domains are Market definition – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) (17 controls), Analytical tools: sources of evidence and evaluating competition among firms – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) (6 controls), Rebuttal evidence: failing firms, entry and repositioning, efficiencies – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) (6 controls). Every control below carries what it requires and what an assessor expects to see.
Framework summaries on this platform are interpretations grounded in the published source, for educational and compliance planning purposes. They do not reproduce or replace the official standards. Refer to the authoritative source for the definitive text. Framework names and trademarks belong to their respective organisations.
Framework Domains (15)
Analytical tools: sources of evidence and evaluating competition among firms – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.1 | Sources of evidence and their probative weight |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.2.A | Generally applicable evidence of rivalry |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.2.B | Competition where firms set terms |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.2.C | Competition where terms are bargained or auctioned |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.2.D | Competition through capacity and output decisions |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.2.E | Competition on innovation and product variety |
Guideline 10: Competing buyers, including labor markets – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.10 | Harm to workers, creators and suppliers as buyers |
Guideline 11: Partial ownership and minority interests – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.11 | Partial ownership, minority stakes and influence |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.11-A | Avoiding a constraint that binds only one party |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.11-B | Exploiting a procurement process favouring the target |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.11-C | Dampened incentive in a concentrated market |
Guideline 1: Presumption from a significant increase in concentration – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.1 | Concentration increase triggers the structural presumption |
Guideline 2: Eliminating substantial competition between the merging firms – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.2 | Loss of substantial competition between the merging firms |
Guideline 3: Increasing the risk of coordination – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.3 | Merger risk of coordinated effects |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.3.A | Primary factors showing susceptibility to coordination |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.3.B | Secondary factors and structural barrier rebuttal |
Guideline 4: Eliminating a potential entrant in a concentrated market – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.4 | Loss of a possible entrant to a concentrated market |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.4.A | Actual potential competition and likely future entry |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.4.B | Perceived potential competition and pressure on incumbents |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.4.C | Separating potential entry from entry as rebuttal |
Guideline 5: Creating a firm that may limit rivals' access to products or services – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.5.A | Ability and incentive to limit access |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.5.A.1 | Ability and incentive four-factor assessment |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.5.A.2 | Industry factors, market structure and rebuttal |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.5.B | Visibility into rivals' sensitive information |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.5.C | Entry barriers and deterred investment |
Guideline 6: Entrenching or extending a dominant position – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.6 | Entrenching or extending an existing dominant position |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.6.A | Entrenching dominance through entry barriers and nascent threats |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.6.B | Extending dominance into a related market |
Guideline 7: Trends toward consolidation – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.7 | Consolidation trends and heightened merger risk |
Guideline 8: Series of multiple acquisitions – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.8 | Serial acquisitions assessed as a cumulative strategy |
Guideline 9: Multi-sided platforms – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.9 | Platform sides, network effects and conflicts of interest |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.9-A | Acquisitions between competing platform operators |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.9-B | Acquiring participants to deny rivals network effects |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.9-C | Control of services that enable multi-platform participation |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-2.9-D | Control of other inputs used in platform services |
Market definition – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3-A | Direct evidence of competition between the parties |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3-B | Direct evidence of market power exercised |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3-C | Practical indicia of a relevant market |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3-D | Hypothetical monopolist and monopsonist test |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.A | How the hypothetical monopolist test is framed |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.B | Running the test: terms, benchmarks and size of the increase |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.C | Recapture, critical loss and the margin evidence |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.1 | Markets drawn around targeted customers |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.2 | The geographic dimension of the market |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.2.a | Markets built on supplier locations |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.2.b | Markets built on customer locations |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.3 | Supplier responses outside market definition |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.4 | Clustered markets for analytical convenience |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.5 | Bundled product markets |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.6 | One-stop shop markets |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.7 | Market definition where innovation is harmed |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.3.D.8 | Input and labour market definition |
Market participants, market shares and concentration – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.4 | When shares and concentration carry weight |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.4.A | Identifying market participants |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-4.4.B | Choosing and calculating market shares |
Rebuttal evidence: failing firms, entry and repositioning, efficiencies – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)
| Code | Title |
|---|---|
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-3.1 | Failing firm defense and its narrow scope |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-3.1-A | Grave probability of business failure |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-3.1-B | Reorganization prospects dim or nonexistent |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-3.1-C | Only available purchaser and alternative offers |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-3.2 | Rebuttal through entry and repositioning |
| us-doj-and-ftc-merger-guidelines-2023::MG-3.3 | Cognizable efficiencies and the four criteria |
What is US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) and who does it apply to?
US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) is a compliance framework from United States with 15 domains and 61 controls. The joint US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (December 2023): the eleven guidelines and the economic and evidence-based tests by which the two agencies judge whether a merger may substantially lessen competition, with what merging parties should be ready to show at each step, from the HHI presumption to market definition and rebuttal evidence. It is used by organisations to establish and maintain compliance with industry standards and regulatory requirements.
What does US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) actually require?
US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) has 61 controls organised across 15 domains. The largest domains are Market definition – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) (17 controls), Analytical tools: sources of evidence and evaluating competition among firms – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) (6 controls), Rebuttal evidence: failing firms, entry and repositioning, efficiencies – US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) (6 controls). Each control defines specific requirements that organisations must implement to achieve compliance.
If I already comply with another framework, how much of US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) do I already cover?
US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) does not currently have cross-framework mappings in our system. Check back as we continuously expand our mapping database.
How do I implement US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023)?
Start your US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) compliance journey by running a self-assessment on our platform to identify your current compliance posture. Our AI advisory can answer specific questions about US DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines (2023) requirements, and cross-framework mapping helps you leverage existing controls from other frameworks you may already comply with. Create a free account to access all 61 controls and track your progress.
Start Your Compliance Journey
Create a free account to run self-assessments, get AI advisory, and track your compliance progress across 1,398 frameworks.
Get Started Free →Free forever, no credit card required